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 1. Introduction 1
 
From the moment Ernst Haas acknowledged the presence of diverging background 
conditions in the cases of the European Communities and Latin American integration 
schemes (Haas 1967, Haas and Schmitter 1964: 711, Mattli 2005: 339-40), incentives 
for using the latter as a setting for testing general proposition declined dramatically.  
 
Against this background, the institutional reform of the former Andean Pact, established 
by the treaty known as the Cartagena Agreement,2 went rather unnoticed. The newly 
founded Andean Community3 emulated the polity design of the European Community. 
Supranationality was reinforced, and community organs were established with a strik-
ing resemblance to their European counterparts. A General Secretary was established 
as the executive organ of the Community, to supervise compliance with community 
law, make legislative proposals, and represent community interests. A Commission 
comprised of member states representatives was established as the legislature, 
through which general policies were adopted, and a Parliament was established with 
some deliberative powers, representing the peoples of the Andean region. The Andean 
Court of Justice (ACJ) was established on May 28, 1979, by virtue of the Treaty of 
Creation of the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, and began its work on 
January 5th, 1984, after a long process of national ratifications.4 On the advice of Euro-
pean officials5, the design of the new court was modelled on the European Court of 
Justice (Cruz Vilaça and Sobrino 1996: 20, Frischhut 2003: 274, Vigil Toledo 2004: 
939)  
 
As a consequence of constitutional cross fertilization (on the emerging phenomena of 
constitutional cross-fertilization and global judicial cooperation see Slaughter 2003: 
195), the Andean Court applied a teleological interpretation of the Agreement and de-
                                                
 
1  I am deeply indebted to the people of the graduate school “Multilevel Constitutionalism”, Faculty of 
Law of the Humboldt University of Berlin; in particular Dr. Daniel Thym and my fellow colleagues, 
whose sharp comments and critiques are a crucial part of this paper. I am also grateful to Andrew Ma-
son who did a wonderful job in revising much of my English. Finally, my gratitude also extends to an 
anonymous reader of the Otto Suhr Institute, Free University of Berlin, who made valuable comments 
on my research. 
2  Hereinafter also the “Agreement”. 
3  Comunidad Andina established by the Trujillo Protocol of March 10th, 1996 
4  On the process of ratification, and particularly the Venezuelan position, see Marwege 1995:104 
5  On the advising role placed by officials of the European Community, among them Pierre Pescatore 
(by that time judge of the ECJ), Gerard Olivier (European Commission), Maurice Lagrange (Advocat 
General) y Walter Much (European Commission), see Frischhut 2003: 249 
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 veloped in its jurisprudence the doctrines of supremacy of community law (primacía) 
and direct applicability (aplicabilidad directa) of its norms. According to the former doc-
trine, national law has to yield to community law; according to the latter, community 
norms do not need to be transposed into national law in order to be invoked before 
national courts by individuals. The fact that individuals could now invoke community 
law in national courts, empowered them to hold governments to their international 
commitments (Slaughter 2000a: 1105 makes this argument for the European case), 
and favour internalisation of international norms and rules into the domestic legal sys-
tem. (Börzel 2002: 18) 
 
Yet, the outcomes of regional integration have been disappointing. In the 27 years of 
the existence of the Andean Court, the Community has not been able to establish a 
customs union, which was repeatedly postponed by intergovernmental decisions,6 and 
only in 1995 was an “imperfect customs union” announced.7 As a result, the Andean 
Community has not been able to speak with one voice before the WTO. In addition, 
both Peru and Colombia have announced bilateral negotiations with the United States 
with a view to concluding a free trade agreement. Finally, in 2006 Venezuela gave no-
tice of its formal desire to withdraw from the Community. 
 
The divergence of integration outcomes, despite the convergence of institutional de-
sign, poses an interesting puzzle, which this paper seeks to address. What prevented 
the ACJ from becoming the engine of Andean integration? How have the member 
states as the “Masters of the Treaty” been able to defy the neofunctionalist logic of in-
tegration through law? Was Ernst Haas right after all when he argued that certain 
background conditions are sine qua non for any regional integration process?8
Based on findings in the Andean Community, I claim that supranational courts are not 
inherently expansive, and they do not necessarily seek empowerment. However rather 
than relying on a neorationalist approach that emphasizes the role of the courts as 
agents of the member states, I develop a hypothesis on constitutional dialogues. I as-
                                                
 
6  For an overview of these decision and protocols that postponed the deadlines for the Andean Cus-
toms Union in 1976, 1978, 1987, 1996 and 1997 see Arellano (2004:7) 
7  The current tariff scheme was established in 1995, but is considered an imperfect customs union by 
the Andean Community because of the numerous products that were exempted and the heterogene-
ous treatment given to the member states. On this issue see web site of the Andean Community 
<http://www.comunidadandina.org/comercio.htm> 
8  For instance societal pluralism, high levels of economic development and ideological convergence. 
(Haas 1961; Rosamond 2005: 246) 
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 sume that these are not a necessary effect of doctrines, such as supremacy and direct 
effect, nor do they emerge as a consequence of legal isomorphism rooted on prelimi-
nary rulings procedures (article 234 EC). Nevertheless, the absence of constitutional 
constituencies at national level can be a suppressing factor of judicial activism at the 
supranational level, even in cases of evident judicial cross fertilization. This is so be-
cause if the community attempts to take over a given policy field by means of judicial 
shirking,9 it is necessary that comprehensive and abstract principles be previously 
shaped, so that they can be applied to a vast majority of cases and situations and have 
at the same time the ability to spill over to other policy fields. In turn, for these princi-
ples to trump state executives’ policies, the court has to rule against member states 
and activate a constitutional dialogue with national courts that are willing to negotiate 
their influence on judicial outcomes at the expense of other relevant national actors 
such as governments, supreme courts, and constitutional courts.  
 
This paper proceeds in the following way: 
Part I will briefly describe the part of the EU-polity that was reproduced in the Andean 
Community, and is important for our analysis, namely the Court and the procedural law.   
Part II will focus on the performance of the Andean Preliminary ruling in two fields of 
case law:  
 
a) The Andean Common Market through the Liberalization Programme, which was 
established by the Cartagena Agreement. I will use insights from neofunctionalism, 
which has had a growing influence in European case law, in contrast to principles of 
international law. I will also focus on the understanding of the method of teleological 
interpretation that the Andean Court of Justice allegedly used in its ruling, under the 
premise that this method allows the scope of European law to expand, and that this is 
apparently part of the strategy of supranational judiciary.  
 
b) The Common Policy on Intellectual Property is clearly the field that has motivated 
the majority of preliminary rulings. We will unveil the real strategy of the Andean Court, 
taking stock of the teleological guise adopted by the supranational judge, in light of the 
European judicial saga. 
 
                                                
 
9  I use this word with the meaning given to it by principal-agent scholars. (Tallberg 2002: 28) 
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 Part III will propose some explanations that could give our data the necessary coher-
ence in order to be understood. 
 
 
2. The Neofunctionalist Approach to the Puzzle and the Engine of 
Integration 
 
My work will focus on two areas within the jurisprudence of the ACJ, tracing a doctrinal 
line that might have been established by means of preliminary rulings. I will analyze the 
results of the repeatedly announced teleological interpretation of community law, and 
the particularities of the policy areas that seem to monopolize court activities in Quito, 
that is to say, Common Industrial Property Law (currently decision 486), as well as the 
doctrinal substance that may be found in the Court’s resolutions in the area of common 
market formation. We will compare the results of the analyses with the initial goals in 
mind at the time of establishing the ACJ, i.e., giving the integration process the neces-
sary momentum by means of consolidating Andean community law. 
 
My approach will be neofunctionalist, as due consideration will be given to subnational 
actors – private litigants in particular – and, for the sake of analysis, member states will 
not be treated as unitary actors; on the contrary, such states summon a diversity of 
interests and players that do not necessarily match the interests of their governments 
(Stone Sweet 2001). Nonetheless, I will analyze the current explanations and assump-
tions that have been in place since many scholars revisited the role played by the ECJ 
in the European integration process. Finally, focusing on the role of supranational 
courts, it is my aim to search for causal mechanisms that could explain integration out-
comes. Therefore I will analyze the normative content of supranational jurisprudence in 
the Andean Community. The dominant theoretical model among neofunctionalist 
scholars would expect the Andean Court to advance integration in cooperation with 
special interest groups and national courts, trying to maintain an aura of technical deci-
sion-making based on legal criteria, “masking” its true agenda, like the ECJ did in the 
European case (Burley and Mattli 1993). By mixing a Court-devised Cocktail of “expan-
sive interpretation of community law plus direct effect doctrine” (Dehousse 1998), the 
supranational court would be expected to seek empowerment that allows judicial re-
view of national law. But for this objective to be achieved, collaboration with national 
courts is essential. Therefore, necessary “constitutional dialogues” are expected to 
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 emerge (Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler 1998, Stone Sweet 2000) in which inter-
court relationships are negotiated, thereby pulling member states into compliance with 
court rulings. This scheme is based on the general assumption that judges are inter-
ested in promoting their independence, influence, and authority (see a general theory 
of judicial interests in Alter 2001: 45), which would also be expected to be the case in 
the Andean Court of Justice.  
 
By adopting a neofunctionalist perspective, I depart from Latin American academic 
traditions that have analyzed the evolution of integration in the light of  strategies on 
how to achieve integration, from cepalismo, to structuralism and neoliberalism,10 which 
have assumed that the relevant actors in the analysis – if not the only actors – are 
States (e.g. Blanco 1997: 137). Success or failure of regional integration is explained 
by the political will of the member states to advance integration in given periods of 
time.11 This paper seeks to challenge this traditional state-centric view. 
 
Based on findings made in the Andean region, we claim that the neofunctionalist 
analysis of European integration can be revised with the help of the comparative 
method. This is especially the case for the propositions that have been taken for 
granted in the European setting, like for instance the inherently expansive nature of 
community institutions and their preference for advancing integration (Mattli and 
Slaughter 1998: 187). After all, how can we be sure that rulings like, say, Dassonville or 
Costa ENEL are spawned by a strategy of a judiciary interested in promoting its inde-
pendence, influence, and authority (Alter 2001), or that they are a product of legal path 
dependency (Stone Sweet and Brunell 2004), if we do not analyze these propositions? 
The use of the comparative method allows for systematic testing of hypotheses that 
claim to be of general validity (Ortiz 2004).  
 
Moreover, a general theory should not only be in a position to explain why expected 
outcomes occur in some settings, but also why they do not occur in others. That is to 
say, a satisfactory explanation identifies the relevant factors that cause a phenomenon 
                                                
 
10  In Latin American literature, it is often talked about inward integration “integración hacia adentro” 
based on solidarity (estructuralismo) and outwards integration “integración hacia fuera” assimilated to 
neoliberalism. Although I dissociate from this line of analysis,  it might be clarifying to consult Blanco, 
Ronald (1997) 
11  Alan Fairlie Reinoso, for instance, argues that it is the chancelleries of the member states that were 
the principal elements in the stimulation of the governments’ integration policies. (Fairlie Reinoso 
1997: 184). Similar explanations in Arellano (2004:8). 
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 and, at the same time, predicts its absence if – all things being equal - the relevant fac-
tors are not present. Therefore, we should not refuse to test the ability of a theory to be 
self-reflexive, since any comprehensive theory of integration should also potentially be 
a theory of disintegration (Schmitter 2003). Conversely, if the causal factors are pre-
sent and the phenomenon is not, then the explanation is unsatisfactory, if not com-
pletely wrong. 
 
As I show in this paper, all variables that have been deemed relevant in neofunctional-
ists’ models, like for instance, policy biased institutions, commitment institutions, imper-
fect contracting, interest associations, shift of expectations, etc. are present in the func-
tional equivalent. Further, and in contrast with other Latin American arrangements, in-
dicators of progressive integration (Haas 1961: 367) are extremely high in the Andean 
Community due to the establishment of conflict resolution at the supranational level. 
However, the actors’ strategies – particularly those of the Court - do not conform to the 
dominant model, and therefore something is likely to be wrong with the model.12
 
European integration - as a whole process - has been compared with other settings like 
Latin America before (Haas and Schmitter 1964, Mattli 2005), but the results have 
been far from conclusive, since these scholars ended up focusing on the diverging con-
text rather than on the functional equivalent. However it has proved very fruitful to use 
neofunctionalism in a circumscribed manner in order to avoid syncretism (Rosamond 
2000: 103). If neofunctionalism’s core arguments are correct, they should also hold true 
for our comparative enterprise, since the relevant variables are present in both settings. 
 
 
2.1. Coping with Integration through Emulation? 
 
The creation of a supranational court of justice was heralded by many as an impulse to 
facilitate the integration process (JUNAC 1979: 15, 84) – the consolidation of what was 
considered to be the most important integration scheme among developing countries 
(Bondia García 1999: 111). Others saw in an Andean Court of Justice the missing ele-
ment that was essential to any regional enterprise (Cruz Vilaça and Sobrino 1996: 92, 
                                                
 
12  Philippe Schmitter warned in his ‘Neo-neofunctionalism’ that if actors strategies were to change sig-
nificantly in the absence of variation in the specified variables, something is very likely to be wrong 
with the model. (Schmitter 2003: 52) 
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 Díaz Barrado 1999: 62), or the vehicle towards building a judicial discipline like that of 
the European Community (Weiler 1993: 421), especially since, to some Latin American 
scholars, the Cartagena Agreement appeared to be the constitutional charter of a 
community of law, just like its European counterpart (Montaño Galarza 2004: 969). This 
would especially the case, if the Andean non-compliance problem was assumed to be 
related to a cost-avoiding strategy of the member states (on non-compliance 
aproaches see Börzel 2002). 
 
If the newly created Andean Court was already exhibiting a striking resemblance to the 
court in Luxembourg, it was procedural law that would have the most European influ-
ence. The Treaty Establishing the Court of Justice of the Andean Community 
(TCTJCAN) envisages: non-compliance procedures; nullifying procedures; a recourse 
of inaction or omission; preliminary rulings; and, from 1996 onwards, the Court has 
been granted competencies on arbitration and labour jurisdiction (Sánchez Chacón 
2001: 41-3). 
 
The goal of the founders of the TCTJCAN was to give the Court tools equivalent to its 
European counterpart,13 and thus finally to achieve the dynamism that was deemed 
necessary for the Andean Group to succeed. Non-compliance by member states with 
the duties imposed by the Agreement was usually responded to with retaliatory action 
in the form of suspension and non-compliance by the contracting parties (Marwege 
1995: 69).  Additionally, the European judicial saga that had led to the establishment of 
the community legal system (Mattli and Slaughter 1996) was well known by the mem-
ber states, as were the doctrines of direct effect (case 26/62 Van Geld & Loos [1963]) 
and of supremacy of community law (case 6/64 Costa ENEL [1964]). Those doctrines 
had been established through the mechanism of preliminary rulings, and, despite initial 
opposition from the member states, were incorporated into the acquis communautaire, 
labelling the Court the “engine of integration” (Schroeder 2004: 186). 
 
However, implementation of this judicial mechanism within the Andean region has been 
far from successful. On the one hand, there is no consensus on the efficacy of Andean 
                                                
 
13  With the adoption of the Trujillo Protocol on March 10th, 1996, an institutional reform of the Andean 
Community was made. The Andean System of Integration (SAI) was established with the aim of rein-
forcing effective implementation of supranational norms (Secretaría General CAN 2006: p. 15) 
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 community law, and on the other hand, 27 years after its foundation, the Andean 
Community has not been able to achieve its main goal of establishing a common mar-
ket. Indeed, what exists today, is an imperfect customs union ("unión aduanera imper-
fecta"; Taccone and Nogueira 2005: 51).  
 
 
3. The Andean Preliminary Ruling 
 
Andean scholars seem to have a consistent view of the importance of this mechanism. 
Uribe Restrepo confidently states that without this preliminary mechanism community 
law would have virtually no chance of functioning adequately (Uribe Restrepo 1993: 
19). Likewise, Luis Sáchica argues that legal integration is only possible as long as 
national judges give direct effect and prevalence to community law over national law 
(Sáchica 1985: 150). 
 
From a neofunctionalist perspective, by means of a strategic use of preliminary rulings 
actors can further their individual interests (Stone Sweet and Brunell 2004: 52-5, Stone 
Sweet 2001: 17). The actors come before the community judge and exert influence on 
the policy-making process, with the aim of changing less favourable norms into more 
favourable ones (Stone Sweet 2001: 8). 
 
This in turn sees a flourishing of constitutional dialogues, through which national courts 
bargain their final position at the macro-level (Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler 
1998).  
 
Why, then, have the goals of the common market not been accomplished, if the An-
dean Community has shaped a polity design equivalent to that of the European Com-
munity, with a supranational court that has the ultimate power to interpret community 





 3.1. Establishing the Common Market by Expansive Interpretation 
 
In L’esprit des lois, Charles Montesquieu described judges that did not work creatively 
to interpret the law; according to the Roman tradition, their function was to serve as 
mere mouthpieces of the law, either absolving or convicting defendants (Montesquieu 
1748: 82). Nonetheless, analysis of the role of the ECJ in the integration process sug-
gests that the framework treaties allow plenty of scope for creativity in choosing from 
among different possible interpretations of the law (Dehousse 1998: 72); and the ECJ 
has not missed the chance to attempt an extensive interpretation of community norms 
whenever the text lacks specificity. In the Dassonville ruling (case 8/74 [1974]), the 
Court expanded the meaning of article 30 of the Treaty, reasoning that “banning dis-
criminatory measures” should be understood as prohibiting any norm capable of im-
peding directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade. According to 
this interpretation it is not so relevant whether a given national measure is overtly dis-
criminatory in nature or not; what is relevant is the impact of this measure on intra-
community trade (Dehousse 1998: 74). Nevertheless, the Court did not why it made 
this choice. We will come back to this issue. 
 
Andean case law found itself confronted with similar questions, since article 41 of the 
Cartagena Agreement established a programme that pursued the progressive disman-
tlement of trade barriers, namely the Programa de Liberación de la Comunidad 
Andina.14 Nevertheless, article 55 of the Agreement allowed a list of exceptions to lib-
eralization, with goods that were considered sensitive for the economies of member 
states.15 However, the text of the Agreement was not explicit about the nature or the 
scope of these exemptions, and this provided a perfect opportunity for the Court to fill 
in the gap. 
 
In case 1-IP-90 on preliminary ruling, the plaintiffs Aluminio Reynolds Santo Domingo 
and the Sociedad Aluminio Nacional S.A. sued the Colombian Government, claiming 
the annulment of a governmental decree – Ley 75 of 1986 - that imposed a tax of 18 
                                                
 
14  Acuerdo de Cartagena Artículo 72 (ex artículo 41).- El Programa de Liberación de bienes tiene por 
objeto eliminar los gravámenes y las restricciones de todo orden que incidan sobre la importación de 
productos originarios del territorio de cualquier País Miembro 
15  This article was amended by Decision 217 of the Commission, and ratified as an amendment of the 
Cartagena Agreement by virtue of the Quito Protocol of the 12th of May, 1987. Today it has been 
abrogated. 
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 per cent on the CIF value of aluminium imported from Venezuela.  The claimants re-
quested that the Cartagena Agreement be interpreted teleologically, thus vindicating 
the goals of the integration process. Although article 55 and its list of exceptions to lib-
eralization could not force member states to reduce existing tariffs on these goods, this 
position prohibited both raising current tariffs levied on them and taxing them with any 
additional duty. Thus, the existence of lists of exceptions to liberalization should be 
interpreted as a mere delay in the process of dismantling trade barriers, something the 
member states had committed themselves to through the Liberalization Programme.   
 
In light of neofunctionalism, this should not surprise us, considering that in 1988 the 
Court had highlighted the teleological interpretation of Andean community law, which 
had its foundation in community primary law and served the integrationist common 
purpose (propósito común integracionista)16
 
On the other hand, the Colombian government fiercely opposed this position, claiming 
that the Andean Commission itself, i.e. the legislative body, had decided to amend arti-
cle 55 of the Agreement introducing the lists of exceptions by decision 217 – secondary 
community law - arguing that “systematic interpretation [is] the only valid source when it 
comes to norms that are part of a coherent legal body like the Cartagena Agree-
ment”17. The defendant added that the text of the Cartagena Agreement should be in-
terpreted as obliging States to refrain from raising tariffs only on those goods expressly 
listed in the Liberalization Programme of article 41; it follows that the programme can-
not be applied to a comprehensive18 set of goods, either currently or in the future.19
 
In its national stage, the case came before the highest Colombian Administrative Court 
(Consejo de Estado de la República de Colombia) which referred it to the Andean 
Court requesting a preliminary ruling on articles 45 (today 76) and 55 (today abrogated) 
                                                
 
16  “En cuanto a la interpretación del derecho comunitario, ratifica el Tribunal en esta oportunidad los 
criterios establecidos en anterior sentencia, dictada en el Proceso No. 1-IP-87. Se aplica los métodos 
de hermenéutica jurídica generalmente aceptados, pero corresponde, llegado el caso, el empleo 
preferente de los métodos funcional, sistemático y teleológico. La utilización de este último tiene su 
fundamentación en el mismo Tratado de Creación del Tribunal, ya que sus atribuciones derivan de la 
necesidad de contribuir a la consecución del propósito común integracionista. (case 1-IP-88) 
17  “interpretación sistemática como la única válida tratándose de normas que hacen parte de un cuerpo 
legislativo coherente como es el Acuerdo de Cartagena” (case 1-IP-90) 
18  “universal” in the words of the Colombian government 
19  Acuerdo de Cartagena: Artículo 76.- (antiguo artículo 45) El Programa de Liberación será 
automático e irrevocable y comprenderá la universalidad de los productos, salvo las disposiciones de 
excepción establecidas en el presente Acuerdo, para llegar a su liberación total en los plazos y 
modalidades que señala este Acuerdo 
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 of the Cartagena Agreement, and adjudication on the matter of whether member states 
should retain the right to raise tariffs on goods that were listed as exceptions to the 
Liberalization Programme. 
The Andean Court was confronted with two contradictory interpretations. On the one 
hand there was the expansive interpretation, in the style of Dassonville, in which the 
consequences of additional taxation on imported goods were taken into consideration; 
on the other hand, there was the restrictive interpretation demanded by the Colombian 
government, claiming that if the text of the Agreement did not specifically prohibit rais-
ing tariffs, it should be understood that member states retained their right to do so. 
 
The Court accepted the latter argumentation, and pointed out that in this case a norm 
that restricted the freedom of member states was at stake. This meant, according to 
the Court, that this norm was also subject to a restrictive interpretation, and that mem-
ber states were free to decide for themselves on matters of tariffs and restrictions re-
lated to these exempted goods;20 therefore the Cartagena Agreement by no means 
prohibited them from levying new taxes or giving these goods favourable treatment.21  
The Court went on to state: “it must not be forgotten, finally, that norms that limit free-
dom must be interpreted restrictively, as the exception to the general rule they are, 
according to a universally accepted principle of interpretation”22. 
 
This restrictive interpretation was considered by the Andean judges to be compatible 
with article 3 of the Cartagena Agreement, which states that in order to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaty, a more advanced trade liberalization programme should be 
used than the agreements reached in the Treaty of Montevideo of 1980. While it must 
not be overlooked that the Court had previously accepted the Liberalization Pro-
gramme as the most important mechanism to achieve the common integrationist goals, 
its restrictive reasoning indicates that the Andean Court yielded to the position of inter-
national law that stands against eventual loss of sovereignty of the States (Weiler 
1982: 270).  
 
                                                
 
20  “…los países miembros son autónomos para decidir sobre gravámenes y restricciones en relación 
con productos reservados o exceptuados…” (case 1-IP-90) 
21  “… el Acuerdo de Cartagena en ningún caso les prohíbe imponer nuevos gravámenes o conceder 
dichos productos un tratamiento más favorable” (Ibid.) 
22  “No debe olvidarse, finalmente, que las normas que limitan la libertad deben ser interpretadas 
restrictivamente, como excepción que son a la regia general, según un principio de interpretación 
universalmente aceptado”. (Ibid.) 
 13
 Although preliminary rulings on the issue of the Liberalization Programme are scarce, 
the doctrine of restrictive interpretation was again invoked in the discussion of case 3-
IP-93, which was initiated by the Sociedad de Aluminio Nacional against the Colombian 
Customs Authority (Dirección de Aduana de Colombia), on the same grounds and di-
rected against the same decree, namely the Ley 75 of 1986. In this case, the Court 
came back to the precedent and pointed out that restrictive interpretation should be 
used when it comes to Liberalization Programme “…since the clear goal of those 
norms is that of limiting the freedom which governments initially have for the purpose of 
levying taxes, in accordance with their loyal knowledge and understanding”23
 
The Court once again discarded any expansive interpretation.24 Consequently, mem-
ber states retained the right to impose taxes and other duties on imports coming from 
the region, as long as they were listed as exemptions to the Liberalization Programme. 
 
From the point of view of a contributing towards the consolidation of a common market, 
this interpretation goes clearly in the opposite direction (for the same argument, see 
Marwege 1995: 250). Moreover, it strengthens the decision-making capacities of the 
member states in the field of taxation of goods. 
 
If we take a look at the European situation, we see that the ECJ has been confronted 
with the possibility of restricting community policies for the sake of the freedom of 
member states, but has interpreted differently the Treaty’s objectives concerning re-
strictions of the relevant policy, and hence the latter has had to yield to the former. In 
the case of Continental Can 6/72, (paragraph 24) the ECJ ruled that eventual restric-
tions imposed on competition policy find their limit in the general principles of the legal 
order, contained in articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty (Anweiler 1997: 211). Moreover in 
case 3/62 Commission v. Luxembourg25 the European Court used the teleological in-
                                                
 
23  “…ya que el claro objetivo de dichas normas es el de limitar la libertad que inicialmente se encuentran 
los gobiernos para imponer gravámenes según su leal saber u entender” (case 3-IP-93) 
24  “El Programa de Liberación, como se ha visto, se refiere a una “universalidad” relativa de productos y 
no a la totalidad de los originados en la Subregión.”... (case 3-IP-93, citing case 1-IP-90) 
 “Este principio de hermenéutica viene en respaldo de la interpretación de los Artículos 45 y 54 del 
Acuerdo de Cartagena, adoptada por el Tribunal según las consideraciones que anteceden, ya que el 
claro objetivo de dichas normas es el de limitar la libertad en que inicialmente se encuentran los 
Gobiernos para imponer gravámenes según su leal saber y entender. Tales limitaciones, que 
obviamente requieren de consagración expresa, han de ser interpretadas restrictivamente, como en 
este caso lo ha hecho el Tribunal.” (case 3-IP-93, citing case 1-IP-90) 
25  “…it follows, then, from the clarity, certainty and unrestricted scope of articles 9 and 12, from the gen-
eral scheme of their provisions and of the treaty as a whole, that the prohibition of new customs du-
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 terpretation and ruled that restrictive interpretation was to be used in those cases 
where the question at stake was about eventual exemptions to the policy of free 
movement of goods (Anweiler 1997: 232). 
 
It has been argued that this dynamic approach can be found in periods of inertia and 
stagnation of the Commission and the Council of the EU (Rasmussen 1986: 178) which 
in turn reminds us that, within the Andean Region, the deadlines for the establishment 




3.2. Common Policy on Intellectual Property: the Case of the Patents 
 
Regulation of industrial property rights, especially those related to patents, belong to 
the competencies of the Andean Community. This has also been the policy field that 
has demanded the most jurisprudential activity in Quito. For instance, during the period 
2004-2005, preliminary rulings related to the common policy on industrial property 
amounted to 92% of the total sum of preliminary rulings from that period of time 
(TJCAN 2005: 7). 
 
 
3.2.1. Decision 85 and the Stauffer Chemical Doctrine 
 
The Andean Commission approved decision 85 (5th of June 1974) with the name 
“Regulation for the Applicability of Norms on Industrial Property”26. Its source of inspira-
tion was Colombian law, which it followed almost to the letter.27 This decision coined a 
remarkable phase in Andean jurisprudential history, since it was under its rule that the 
doctrines of Supremacy (Preeminencia; case 2-IP-88) and Direct Applicability (Aplica-
bilidad Directa: case 1-IP-88) were established.  Decision 85 sought to give uniformity 
to national regulations on the concession and protection of rights stemming from 
                                                                                                                                            
 
ties, linked with the principles of the free movement of products, constitutes an essential rule and that 
in consequence any exception, which moreover is to be narrowly interpreted, must be clearly stipu-
lated” ECJ case 3/62: p. 432 
26  Reglamento para la aplicación de las normas sobre propiedad industrial 
27  The ACJ recognized this fact in case 3-IP-88. 
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 trademarks, patents and licenses. But its most remarkable feature was its article 5, 
c).28 This disposition prohibited national authorities from granting patents of invention 
to pharmaceutical products, medicaments, therapeutically active substances, bever-
ages and food, all of them for human, animal, or vegetal use. The rule was coherent 
with the import substitution policy of that time; it must not be forgotten that the Agree-
ment considered technological development as a crucial mechanism for the subre-
gion’s development (Article 3 letter a) bis, Agreement of Cartagena). 
 
The first ruling in this saga became known as the Stauffer Chemical ruling (1-IP-88) 
based on decision 85. In this process the Stauffer Chemical Company filed a lawsuit 
against the Industrial Property Division of the Colombian Regulation Authority for In-
dustry and Trade (Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio de la República de Co-
lombia) because the latter failed to register a patent for the invention of a herbicide 
presented by the former. The authority’s refusal motivated the company to file a judicial 
action before the Supreme Administrative Court (Consejo de Estado) to declare the 
decree of refusal null and void, since herbicides were not mentioned by article 5 c). 
That decree of refusal, Resolución 322, apparently violated community law. The Con-
sejo de Estado in turn, acknowledging that the question was a matter of community 
law, requested a preliminary ruling on the matter of whether herbicides should be un-
derstood as being included in the list of non-patentable products, despite not being 
expressly mentioned by article 5 letter c). 
 
The Andean Court again invoked teleological interpretation to assess the question 
raised, and argued in favour of “the preferential use of the functional, systematic and 
teleological interpretation. The use of the latter has its foundation in the Treaty of Crea-
tion of the Court, since its attributions stem from the need to contribute to the common 
integrationist purpose”. 29 It follows then, that the concession of industrial property 
rights should not become an obstacle to the proliferation of technology within the An-
dean region. According to the Court, a patent configures a monopoly over the exploita-
                                                
 
28   “Artículo 5.- No se otorgarán patentes para: (…) c) Los productos farmacéuticos, los medicamentos, 
las sustancias terapéuticamente activas, las bebidas y los alimentos para el uso humano, animal o 
vegetal”. 
29   “…el empleo preferente de los métodos funcional, sistemático y teleológico. La utilización de este 
último tiene su fundamentación en el mismo Tratado de Creación del Tribunal, ya que sus 
atribuciones derivan de la necesidad de contribuir a la consecución del propósito común 
integracionista”. (case 1-IP-88; emphasis added)  
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 tion of an invention. In the words of the Court: “the system of patents must not hinder 
the Andean Community’s process of development, but on the contrary, it must consti-
tute a coadjutant factor”.30 In other words, herbicides should be allowed free use within 
the Andean region. Thus, they were considered to be included among the exemptions 
to patentability listed in article 5, letter c) of decision 85 – teleologically interpreted.  
 
Nevertheless, a seed that would grow with considerable consequences had been 
planted by the supreme interpreter. The Court briefly revealed what it really understood 
by teleological interpretation: it reasoned that it considered that teleological interpreta-
tion had to conform to the goals carried in mind by the organ that generated the norm 
rather then the goals of the Treaty itself.31  
 
The doctrine established for Stauffer Chemical was reaffirmed in the rulings for Ciba 
Geigy A.G., cases 3-IP-89 and 7-IP-89. In those processes the plaintiff, Ciba Geigy 
A.G. judicially proceeded against an administrative act of the Colombian Industrial 
Property Division, again based on the fact that this authority refused to register the 
claimants’ invention: a herbicide. The Industrial Property Division argued that a herbi-
cide was by nature a “medicament with vegetal use”, and therefore one of the exemp-
tions considered in article 5 letter c) of the decision 85, in the terms stated for Stauffer 
Chemicals. The case was referred again to Quito for a preliminary ruling. 
 
The Andean Court came back to the importance of using the teleological interpretation 
over other forms because it was more consistent with communitarian nature than any 
other method of interpretation,32 and it consequently drew attention to the historical 
background of decision 85. This had been discussed in an earlier case 7-IP-89, be-
tween identical parties, in which the Court had implicitly referred to the “dependence 
theory”33; that is to say, laws on industrial property rights had been established by the 
developed countries in times when the Andean countries had not yet become industri-
alized and the possibilities of technology-creation were practically non-existent. More-
over, offering protection to exploitation monopolies – the actual goal of such a system, 
                                                
 
30   “el sistema de patentes no debe entorpecer el proceso de desarrollo de la Comunidad Andina sino, 
por el contrario, debe constituirse en un factor coadyuvante.” (Ibid.) 
31    “teniendo en cuenta la finalidad perseguida por el órgano generador de la norma” (case 1-IP-88) 
32   “Esta interpretación, de otra parte, debe atender al elemento sistemático y al teleológico, de 
preferencia a los elementos gramatical, idiomático, técnico o lingüístico, ya que esa es, precisamente, 
la hermenéutica que mejor se aviene a la naturaleza propia del derecho comunitario” (case 3-IP-89) 
33   In Spanish “teoría de la dependencia” 
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 the Court argued - produced undesired effects on the region’s economy and favoured 
the capture of markets by foreign products.34 The countries belonging to the Andean 
group, were “victims of their dependency on industrialized countries and therefore ex-
tremely vulnerable, requiring an institutional framework that would protect them”.35 The 
Court also elaborated on the limits of this protection, which were outlined by the gen-
eral goal of the Agreement (Article 2), consisting of the promotion of a balanced and 
harmonious development of the member states36. Therefore – according to the Court - 
herbicides were included in the exemptions to patentability listed by article 5 of decision 
85.   
 
 
3.2.2. Decision 344 and the Change of Paradigm 
 
Decision 85 – secondary community law - was in place for 17 years, motivating profuse 
case-law decisions in the Andean Court of Justice, and was replaced by subsequent 
short-lived decisions37 until decision 344 was approved on October 21st, 1993 by the 
Commission of the Cartagena Agreement in Bogotá,38 and came into force on January 
1st, 1994. 
 
Decision 344 – also secondary community law - contained a substantial amendment: 
the Andean Commission had cut away the controversial letter c) of article 5 (now article 
7), and the prohibition for patenting pharmaceutical products was no longer in place. 
                                                
 
34  “Las leyes de propiedad industrial, inspiradas en las necesidades e intereses de los países 
desarrollados habían sido implantadas en los países de la región en momentos en que el desarrollo 
fabril no había realmente comenzado y la posibilidad de creación tecnológica era inexistente. La 
protección a los monopolios de explotación, objetivo fundamental de estos sistemas de patentes, 
producía efectos no deseables para la economía de la región y favorecía la captura de los mercados 
para los productos extranjeros, la tenencia de las patentes por los agentes de la economía 
transnacional, la ninguna o escasa vinculación de la inventiva local con el proceso productivo real, el 
entorpecimiento del flujo tecnológico externo por la imposición de cláusulas restrictivas, la posibilidad 
de fijar precios monopolísticos del aprovechar la patente para eliminar la competencia, etc.”. (case 7-
IP-89)  
35  “[Los países del grupo Andino,] víctimas de su dependencia frente a los países industrializados y 
extremadamente vulnerables, requieren de un marco institucional que los defienda” (Ibid) 
36   “[Las disposiciones de la Decisión 85] tienen como objetivo fundamental establecer una relación de 
consecuencia directa entre el desarrollo socio-económico, en especial el tecnológico, y los derechos 
que se conceden a los particulares. Es decir, que la protección de estos últimos tiene su justificación 
moral, económica y jurídica en que los mismos sean mecanismos que promuevan el desarrollo 
equilibrado y armónico de los Países Miembros y el mejoramiento persistente del nivel de vida de los 
habitantes de la Subregión” (case 3-IP-89). 
37  Decision Nº 311 of 12th of December 1991; Decision 313 of 6th of February, 1992. Significant jurispru-
dence has not been found, which might be explained by the short time they were in place. 
38    Published on the Official Journal Nº 142, 29th of October 1993 
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 This new regulation was clearly less favourable to the Andean pharmaceutical industry, 
which had made profits by trading pharmaceuticals without being bound to pay any 
patent duties or fees to extra-regional companies. According to the assumption that 
private litigants are rational self-interested actors, it would not be long before private 
litigants would make strategic use of preliminary rulings as a mechanism to reinforce 
their preferences, by means of reasserting the goals of the Treaty as guidelines for the 
interpretation of decision 344, especially since the Court of Justice had upheld the im-
portance of the “common integrationist purpose” (ruling 1-IP-88). 
 
The expected action came in the form of case 6-IP-94. The actors were a group of Ec-
uadorian laboratories that filed a lawsuit against their government for having dictated 
decree 1344-A, which regulated at domestic level the above mentioned decision 344, 
because it allegedly violated Andean community law. The presidential decree now fa-
cilitated the concession of patents for those inventions that had been prohibited for 
registration under decision 85.39 Moreover, this measure directly affected the interests 
of the pharmaceutical companies, who argued in their claim that the Ecuadorian phar-
maceutical industry would disappear, that it would be ostracized from the integration 
process, and therefore the spirit of the Cartagena Agreement would be violated.40
 
The case was referred to the Andean Court of Justice, summoned to adjudicate on 
matters concerning the “spirit of the Agreement”. In its final ruling, the Court starts by 
acknowledging “the welfare of the Andean inhabitant as being the first goal of the 
                                                
 
39    Los artículos controvertidos del Decreto 1344-A: 
 “PRIMERA.- Se concederán patentes para todos aquellos inventos cuya patentabilidad no estaba 
permitida antes de la vigencia de las Decisiones 311, 313 y 344 de la Comisión del Acuerdo de 
Cartagena cuando se hubiere obtenido patente en cualquier país extranjero. El plazo de concesión de 
la patente será igual al que falta para completar el plazo de vigencia de la primera patente solicitada 
en el exterior, para cuyo fin se presentará copia de la primera solicitud en el exterior y de la patente 
concedida. En ningún caso el plazo de concesión será superior al de veinte años contado desde un 
año después de tal primera solicitud. Las solicitudes deberán presentarse en el Ecuador dentro del 
plazo de un año desde la vigencia de la Decisión 344.” 
 “SEGUNDA.- De igual modo se concederán patentes para todos aquellos inventos cuya 
patentabilidad no estaba permitida antes de la vigencia de las citadas Decisiones, si es que se 
hubiere solicitado la concesión de patentes en el exterior y se presentaren las solicitudes en el 
Ecuador dentro del plazo de un año desde la vigencia de la Decisión 344 sin prejuicio de lo dispuesto 
en el art. 12 de la Decisión 344 y 10, inciso segundo de este Reglamento. Si se llegare a conceder 
patentes para los inventos referidos en este inciso, sus titulares tendrán los derechos que prevé el 
inciso segundo del Art. 51 de la Decisión 344 y, en general, gozarán de los derechos pertinentes 
derivados de las disposiciones de la Decisión 344 y de la Ley de Patentes de Exclusiva de 
Explotación de Inventos.” 
40   “[d]esaparecería la industria farmacéutica ecuatoriana, quedaría al margen de la integración andina y 
se violaría el espíritu del Acuerdo de Cartagena.” (case 6-IP-94). 
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 subregional agreement, according to article 1 of the Cartagena Agreement, the first 
community norm that guides the very philosophy of the integration mechanism”.41 
However, the Court continues by stating that the Andean Community had been striving 
for common rules that would allow its incorporation - under equal conditions - into a 
world that did not develop uniformly. Therefore “prohibitions regarding pharmaceutical 
patents that were in place before the validity of decision 311, 313 and 344, that is to 
say, those contained in article 5 of decision 85, those prohibitions ceased to be legally 
effective with the new Andean legislation, and so it follows that the prohibitions in arti-
cle 7 of decision 344 are still valid today”.42 Moreover, this interpretation of decision 
344 would be harmonious with the Paris Convention on the protection of Industrial 
Property and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
(TRIPS). “All of them [are] consistent with the common spirit of defence and protection 
of rights emerging from intellectual property, and in order to be applied within the An-
dean group must therefore show absolute accordance with the spirit of decision 344 of 
the Cartagena Agreement”.43
 
The analysis shows that the ACJ draws the principles of Andean community law from 
the will of the legislator – in this case the Commission - and not actually from the found-
ing goals of the Cartagena Agreement, nor from its declared spirit or philosophy of in-
tegration, since neither its goals nor its spirit could possibly have been mutated by the 
mere promulgation of decision 344.44 It must be stated, nevertheless, that Latin Ameri-
can literature on Andean community law overwhelmingly agrees with the assumption 
that the Court actually followed teleological interpretation.45  
 
If we compare this specific finding with the European situation, we see divergence 
among interpretation methods. Despite the fact that the ECJ has made use of the his-
                                                
 
41  “…el bienestar del habitante andino, primer objetivo del Acuerdo Subregional, conforme lo establece 
el artículo 1º del Acuerdo de Cartagena, norma comunitaria primaria que orienta la filosofía misma del 
mecanismo de integración”(case 6-IP-94) 
42   “en lo tocante a las prohibiciones existentes sobre patentes farmacéuticas antes de la vigencia de las 
Decisiones 311, 313 y 344, o sea las que existían en el artículo 5º de la Decisión 85, dichas 
prohibiciones dejaron de tener vigencia a partir de la nueva legislación andina quedando establecido 
como lógica consecuencia, que las únicas existentes a la fecha, son las contempladas en el artículo 
7º de la Decisión 344 hoy vigente” 
43   “Todos ellos convergentes con el espíritu común de defensa y protección de los derechos 
emergentes de la Propiedad Intelectual y que para ser aplicados en los países del grupo andino, 
deben guardar absoluta concordancia con el espíritu de la Decisión 344 del Acuerdo de Cartagena.” 
(Ruling 6-IP-94: 17-8) 
44  This understanding is bolstered by the text of rulings 3-IP-94, and 6-IP-94 where the ACJ makes the 
Ratio Legis of Integration Law equal to the “will of the legislator” 
45   For instance Sáchica (1985), (2001), Uribe Restrepo (1993) and Vigil Toledo (2004) 
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 torical element to interpret some provisions of secondary community law, in case of 
conflict with the goals of the Treaty (EC) it is the teleological interpretation that must 
prevail (Anweiler 1997: 206).46 As a result, secondary community law must necessarily 
be subordinated to the principles that spring from primary law, since otherwise the unity 
of the legal order would be jeopardized (Zuleeg 1969: 97). In other words, it is not 
credible to interpret primary community law according to its ratio legis, and simultane-
ously secondary law with historical-systematic tools of legal interpretation (see case 
ECJ C-300/89 Commission v. Council, and case 45/86 APS; Anweiler 1997). In addi-
tion, and due to reasons of legal certainty, the historical method of interpretation has 
been limited to those cases where the will of the legislator can be drawn from explicit 
documentation incorporated into the piece of legislation, like for instance, an annex or 
addendum (Schroeder 2004: 183). 
 
In the long term, the jurisprudential line adopted by the ACJ allowed Andean law to 
make a smooth transit to the later decision 486. This piece of legislation came into 
force on December 1st, 2000, and replaced decision 344, as well as its successor, de-
cision 85. With decision 486, the Andean Community adapted its Common Policy on 
Industrial Property to the TRIPS agreement, bolstering rights stemming from industrial 
property in accordance with multilateral treaties (Bianchi Pérez 2002: 103), and yielding 
to the interpretation that follows the will of the community legislator. 
 
 
4. The Andean Dilemma and the Neofunctionalist-
Intergovernmentalist Debate 
 
If we carefully analyze the empirical data that we have found in the jurisprudence of the 
ACJ, we are prima facie tempted to admit the prevalence of explanations that are 
based on neorationalist intergovernmentalism rather than on neofunctionalism. In addi-
tion, the assumption according to which supranational courts are agents that serve the 
member states’ interests, and that their effective authority depends on the acceptance 
of its rulings on behalf of the principal becomes plausible. This is because one of the 
                                                
 
46  For this stand Anweiler cites rulings on case C-215/88 (Fleischhandel), case 45/86 (APS), and C-
300/89 (Commission v. Council). However, the author mentions an opposing current to what he cate-
gorizes as teleological-objective interpretation. 
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 crucial neofunctionalist assumptions, namely the expansive nature of supranational 
courts, fails the test in the Andean case with no satisfying explanation. So if the court is 
indulgent with the member states, and these do not flout court’s decisions or do not 
override court rulings through treaty revisions, then – according to the neorationalist 
argument - it should be assumed that member states’ preferences are being served 
(Garrett 1995: 178). Nevertheless, this explanation also remains unsatisfactory in the 
light of principal-agent (P-A) approaches: First, P-A approaches insist that one of the 
purposes that lead member states to delegate authority to a supranational court is to 
solve monitoring problems (Garrett 1995: 172, Garrett and Weingast 1993). However, if 
we assume that the ACJ’s decisions followed member states’ preferences, and then 
realize that this court curtailed its own monitoring competences, then we face a contra-
diction, since the agent would have sought to leave the monitoring problem unsolved. 
Secondly, if the establishment of a court aimed at overcoming a credibility problem 
(Tallberg 2002: 29, Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 4), it remains unexplained how it 
could possibly be in the interest of member states that the court ruled on the preva-
lence of secondary community law over treaty goals. If in the eyes of the court, states 
remain sovereign to alter the course of integration by means of secondary law, then the 
credibility gain is close to nil. Perhaps an eventual sovereignty loss might be avoided, 
but the act of delegation to a court would not make any sense if it is going to shrink its 
own competences. Thirdly, neorationalists have concurred with neofunctionalists that 
courts can be understood as a strategic rational actors. Courts preferences are to ex-
tend (European) community law and their authority to interpret it (Garrett 1995: 173). 
Simultaneously, courts allegedly seek to enhance their reputation through constraining 
the behaviour of a powerful member state, as long as they expect the government to 
accept their decision (Garrett 1995: 178, 80). But in the Andean case, we see that the 
court has undermined the scope of community law in the region, and it did so even in 
cases where the products subject to litigation corresponded to a minor sector of the 
economies, namely herbicides or aluminium.47 In none of the exposed cases, which 
seem to be the most relevant in terms of doctrinal importance, did the court rule against 
any member state in order to enhance its reputation or legitimacy. 
 
                                                
 
47  According to current statistics (2006), imports of herbicide and unwrought aluminum account for less 
than 0,21% and 0,57% of total imports to Colombia. Source: UN’s  Economic Commission for Latin 
America, division of international trade and integration. <http://www.cepal.org/comercio>  (ECLAC 
2005) 
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 So, since neither the neofunctionalist nor the intergovernmentalist approach seem to 
convincingly explain the case of the Andean Community, it becomes necessary to 
frame a new set of assumptions in order to overcome the flaws that have become ap-
parent and to understand the choices made by the ACJ. 
 
 The two sets of data – on the issues regarding the common market and intellectual 
property rights, respectively - testify to two dilemmas with which the Andean Court was 
confronted. 
 
In the case of the exceptions to the establishment of the common market –the Alumin-
ios Reynolds case- the legal facts and argumentations show a conflict between a 
community policy, i.e. liberalization of the market on the one hand, and on the other 
hand a general principle like the freedom of the member states not to be held liable for 
obligations under international law unless the circumstances are clearly and expressly 
stated in any of the agreements in which they engage. 
 
If we try to comprehend the dilemma, we are struck by the fact that the two arguments 
come from different arenas. Private litigants file their arguments from a private sphere, 
while member states refuse to abandon their status as subjects of international law. 
Each tries to force the contender to enter the arena from which they hold their own ar-
gument. There is disagreement as to which set of rules prevails in this situation: com-
munity law in its economic constitutional dimension, or international law with its view of 
the Cartagena agreement remaining a traditional international treaty. We should not be 
surprised by this, since it has often been the case in the history of European integration 
that actors engage in these conflicts with disparate normative expectation.48 This is by 
no means alien to judicial developments. Legal arguments displayed by both litigant 
parties might seem very reasonable from a strategic point of view. Both member states 
and private litigants seem to have exhausted legal arguments that were at their dis-
                                                
 
48  The ruling Costa v. E.N.E.L is a noted example for this. Responding to the Italian government’s alle-
gations that national courts are obliged to apply national law, the Court states settles the argument 
stating that “[By] contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal 
system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the 
member states and which their courts are bound to apply”. (Costa v. E.N.E.L. 6/64). See also Van 
Geld en Loos: “To ascertain whether the provisions of an international treaty extend so far in their ef-
fects it is necessary to consider the spirit, he general scheme and the wording of hose provisions. The 
objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market, the functioning of which is of di-
rect concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this treaty is more than an agreement 
which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states” (Van Geld en Loos 26/62). 
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 posal at that time, and I do not intent to focus on them here. Yet, a political scientific 
analysis should be able to take the debate outside its juridical dimension. 
 
If we are to remain loyal to political reasoning, we should adopt a coherent framework 
before evaluating our data, or interpreting the significance of actors’ choices. The first 
thing to do is to acknowledge that the legal dilemma of the ACJ is not identical to the 
political dilemma it was confronted with. What in the eyes of a litigation lawyer appears 
to be a conflict between (a) the efficacy of a given community’s policies and (b) free-
dom of member states, is for political scientists rather a dilemma about the allocation of 
regulatory authority. In other words, the normative argumentation contained in the legal 
cases tells us little about the instrumental effectiveness of law for furthering integra-
tion.49  
 
As was the case for European member states, the Colombian government’s position 
appears plausible within a model in which there is a clear division between compe-
tences that belong to two different levels. In such a view, community competences are 
limited to those areas that have previously been assigned to it by the member states. 
Because these competences are being transferred gradually, it should not be assumed 
that states have renounced all competences from the outset. For every step towards 
further integration, a new dividing line between both fields of competence should be 
drawn by the member states through the intergovernmental community organ: the An-
dean Commission. If the matter sub judice is about goods that are listed as exemptions 
to liberalization or negative integration (Scharpf 1995), then it is a question that falls 
within the regulatory field of the member states. Because of this clear division of com-
petences, it is for the states and not for the Court to decide if or how these exempted 
goods should be taxed. This model is very close to traditional readings of the treaties 
that we find in international law, that is to say, against eventual losses of state sover-
eignty (Weiler 1982: 270). 
 
The position of the private litigants, on the other hand, corresponds to a different model 
inspired by the European experience. If member states commit themselves to found a 
                                                
 
49  Karen Alter makes a similar argument claiming that legal scholarship and political science correspond 
to different paradigms. The former tends to emphasize the authoritative content of texts, mainly due to 
the tradition of legal exegesis, while the latter focuses on puzzling behaviours, looking for plausible 
explanations that go beyond authoritative sources. (Alter, Dehousse and Vanberg 2002) 
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 community with supranational attributes in order to establish a common market, then it 
can only be assumed that it is beyond the capabilities of individual member states to 
achieve this task on their own. By creating the community and establishing a commit-
ment institution (Mattli 1999), the member states recognize the regulatory authority of 
the Community regarding transnational trade, and leave for themselves only specific 
items or exemptions that correspond to domestic rather than commercial criteria. Thus, 
since community law must be allowed to grow gradually, materializing through statutes 
that begin replacing national law, there is no dividing line separating the two fields of 
authority. When it comes to the common market, member states cede sovereignty to 
the Community, which in turn starts regulating a policy area. If the member states have 
decided from the outset that certain barriers should not yet be dismantled, then the 
Community must respect this. However, this does not mean that the states retain regu-
latory authority over these goods. On the contrary, they can only choose between using 
this privilege and renouncing it; they cannot regulate it. Therefore, every issue arising 
outside of specific exemptions, or every grey area that has not clearly been claimed by 
the member states, falls within the higher regulatory field of the Community. What the 
claim of the private litigants implied in political terms was that the Community should 
take full control of the regulatory authority that it was entitled to exert in this policy field, 
and that national regulation dealing with tariffs higher than those already in place at the 
moment when the list of exceptions was established should be replaced with commu-
nity regulations: in this case the Court’s criteria. This has been called the centralist 
model (Maduro 2002). 
 
By representing the Andean dilemma through these two heuristic models, it is possible 
to identify a crucial difference between it and the experience made with the “Euro-law 
game”. Concerning the establishment of the Andean Common Market – as opposed to 
a partial liberalization programme- there is no certainty as to who is the ultimate author-
ity in policy making. In turn, if there is no certainty as to who should be in charge of the 
intra-community trade policy, it is unlikely that comprehensive and abstract doctrines 
will emerge, since such doctrines must be applicable to a majority of cases. If doctrines 
on Andean intra-regional trade law cannot be applied to all regional trade, they will be 
severely inadequate. We will return to this point later. 
 
For this dilemma of institutional choice to be solved, considerable judicial discretion is 
necessary. In the cases exposed, the Andean Court was required to make a decision 
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 with institutional repercussions, which demanded plausible justification. This is what 
MacCormik has called “second-order justification”, giving reasons that justify choices 
between rival rulings (MacCormick 1978: 101, Maduro 2002: 20). In the case of Das-
sonville, the European Court of Justice did not justify its choice. Instead it resorted to 
what Poiares Maduro called formal reasoning, that is to say, syllogistic reasoning that 
presents the decision of the Court as the only possible legal decision. Yet, by doing so, 
the Court does not answer why this choice was taken, since it does not even acknowl-
edge that a significant choice between two institutional alternatives was at stake. Ac-
cording to Poiares Maduro,  
 
“[T]he adoption of formal reasoning as a model of justification in the Court’s de-
cisions is, in part, a consequence of legal traditions in Member States that are, 
nevertheless, becoming outdated. For the European Court of Justice, the adop-
tion of formal reasoning responded to the need to establish its judicial authority 
by preserving an image of neutrality and impartiality” (Maduro 2002: 22). 
 
This brings us back to our finding once again. Dassonville was about non-tariff barriers 
to trade. The struggle over who was to be in charge of the policy domain of tariffs had 
been settled long ago, and now it was about shaping general principles within an eco-
nomic constitution. The principal question was not about who governed article 30 of the 
EC Treaty, but rather which cases fell within the range of article 30. 
 
Clearly the Andean Court would have had a more daunting task if it was to follow the 
footsteps of the ECJ. If the Andean Court was to perform any formal reasoning on 
which it could base a decision favourable to the private litigants on the road to an eco-
nomic constitution, it had to settle a crucial question: who would have ultimate policy 
authority in the field of the common market? In other words, who would hold the gov-
erning stick of intra-community trade policy? The Community or the member states? 
 
But if the Court had not been confronted with this vital dilemma up to that moment, how 
could it have framed the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy at an earlier stage? 
Firstly, the doctrines were shaped in a policy field that entirely belongs to the Commu-
nity’s competences: industrial property rights. Therefore, no takeover was necessary. 
Secondly, the rulings (Stauffer Chemicals 1-IP-88 and Ciba Geigy 3-IP-89) were not 
cast against a member state, but in favour of the Colombian government’s position, 
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 since they declared that herbicides were non-patentable products, a position defended 
vigorously by the member states. It can therefore be assumed that when member 
states decided to amend decision 85 in order to adjust it to multilateral treaties, the 
Court did not represent much of a threat to them. On the contrary, the judicial discourse 
had been clearly cooperative with member states and had so far undergirded the policy 
of import substitution. So, if the Court was to confirm the position of the member states, 
there was no chance for the national judiciary to defy the status quo of their relationship 
with their respective governments, nor was there any space for inter-court negotiation 
within a national-supranational framework as foreseen by neofunctionalism.  
 
Now let us connect both policy areas, in order to put the problem into context. Just one 
year after the rulings on direct effect and supremacy were announced (both on the 25th 
of May 1988), the question of the common market came before the Court (ruling of 18th 
of May 1990). It is now clear to us that the Court did not have enough time nor leverage 
to favour the centralist model that claimed for regulatory authority to be taken over by 
the Community, since no judicial collaboration with national courts nor any genuine 
transnational constituency (as suggested for Europe in Slaughter 2000b: 248) had pre-
viously been established. Admittedly, it is impossible for us to know if the Court seri-
ously considered this alternative of upholding the centralist model, but if it did, there 
was no realistic way to bring it about. Since the Aluminio Reynolds case could not real-
istically have had any other outcome than it actually did, the choice made by the Court 
is hardly surprising. 
 
The consequence of not upholding the centralist model is that it becomes almost im-
possible for the Court to frame general principles in the policy field of intra-regional 
trade. As mentioned, if any given principle cannot be applied to all goods or cases –or 
at least a vast majority of cases- it renounces any claim of abstraction and remains 
specific to these goods; in turn, if a principle is not abstract enough to spill over to other 
policy areas, judicial discretion is severely curtailed. Further, the only doctrines that 
were actually shaped, namely direct effect and supremacy, were consistent with the 
interests of the other stakeholders, i.e. the member states. However, principles that are 
conditions and aims of the common market, like freedom of movement or non-
discrimination (see the concept of "Basisfunktion" for free movement of goods in Frenz 
2004: 13) are inherently abstract, and were therefore impossible for the Andean Court 
 27
 to tailor for the area of intra-regional trade policy once the centralist model was dis-
carded. Thus the Court’s leeway became even smaller. 
 
Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that on December 9th 1994, the ruling 
Laboratorios vs. Ecuador on the validity of decision 344 implicitly renounced teleologi-
cal interpretation –  insofar as any such interpretation was possible – and adhered to 





This research has focused on Andean integration through an “European prism”, taking 
into consideration the vast literature on European integration that has focused on the 
establishment of the European Community’s legal order. It was not my purpose to find 
solutions to the problems experienced by the Andean integration process, but to high-
light the divergence that exists in an area that should have precisely mirrored the Euro-
pean experience, i.e. the teleological method for the interpretation of community law. 
 
I claim to have found a functional equivalent to the Euro-law game, based on matching 
polity designs, judicial cross-fertilization and similar actors. But at the same time there 
was no “court-devised cocktail” in the Andean case, that is to say no expansive inter-
pretation followed by direct effect of community law (Dehousse 1998: 76). Neither has 
there been a stable set of practices (Stone Sweet 2001: 19)50 despite the mimetic ac-
tion of skilled social Andean actors. The judicial activism associated with neofunctional-
ist and supranational governance theories (Stone Sweet 2000) was lacking, and al-
though there was explicit social demand for expansive interpretation, articulated by 
self-interested social entrepreneurs, the ACJ failed to supply it. (Couso 2004: 41, 
doubts that such supporting structures for legal mobilization from the bottom-up are 
capable of sparking a legal revolution by means of judicial activism in Latin American 
democracies). The alleged engine of integration has not seized power; despite the 
presence of almost all the conditions for constitutional dialogues. Considering that the 
strategy of our main actor – the ACJ - does not conform to neofunctionalist assumption, 
                                                
 
50   ‘One way that institution-building episodes proceed is when actors decide to mimic what they perceive 
to be successful political models, borrowing elements that have proved useful in other institution-
building projects” (Stone Sweet 2001: 19) 
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 something must be flawed with the theoretical model, since it does not include a rever-
sal of doctrines among the possible strategies of the Court. 
 
However, these findings do not necessarily contradict neofunctional readings of Euro-
pean integration. This would only be the case if constitutional dialogues had in fact 
been present in the Andean saga and the outcome had, nevertheless, remained the 
same. Constitutional dialogues between the judiciary should be less seen as a neces-
sary consequence of doctrines, such as direct effect and supremacy, but rather as a 
necessary condition for judicial empowerment. In other words, isomorphism based on 
preliminary rulings procedures (article 234 EC) does not necessary establish vertical 
relations or exchange between supranational courts and national judiciaries. Neither 
can we assume that supranational Courts – no matter how similar to the ECJ- are in-
herently expansive institutions. Thus, if the success of European integration through 
law was the goal for the Andean Community, importing its polity design and its legal 
doctrines proved unsuccessful.      
 
Finally, we are aware that neofunctionalism does not claim to be a general law, and 
most of its scholars warn that it simply describes the process of European integration, 
assuming that certain conditions are present. That has been the explanation given by 
some scholars when dealing with failure in other settings and the discarding of empiri-
cal testing, for instance, in Latin America. However, by reviewing the theoretical model 
used by most neofunctionalist scholars, we offer an alternative explanation for failure in 
integration, derived from the analysis of law, jurisprudence, and both national as well 
as sub national actors’ strategies. It might very well be the case that the actor chosen 
to drive the process ahead, namely the ACJ, has brought it to stagnation. If scholars 
have historically discarded comparative analysis based on divergent background condi-
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